#
Topic in discrete mathematics: Social Choice Theory.

###
Lecture notes: week I
Much of the material in the first three lectures can be found in books
on microeconomics.
`Lecture notes in Microeconomic
theory'' by Ariel Rubinstein
contains the background material on individual preferences and choice (week I)
as well as a chapter on Arrow theorem (week II) and
expected utility theory (Problem set I).

###
Lecture notes (skeleton): week II
Two proofs of Arrow's theorem were described: One following the presentation
in Rubinstein's book and the other following the third proof in the article:

Three Brief Proofs of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
by John Geanakoplos.

Week III
We defined social choice functions and proved
the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We followed the presentation
in

Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach
by Philip Reny

Week IV: The Shapley Shubik power index and information aggregation

We described the model of cooperative $n$ persons game and the Shapley value.
We described the axiomatic definition of the value as well as the formulas
of Shapley and of Owen. We stated the connection of Shapley-Shubik power
index with information aggregation.

A good source is
The Shapley Value by Eyal Winter.

The results on aggregation of information and on indeterminacy (next week)
are from
Social indeterminacy, by Gil Kalai.

Week V: Indeterminacy.