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PUBLICATIONS

A. Books

1. *Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications*, Elsevier Science Publishers / North Holland, Amsterdam (co-edited with Robert J. Aumann):
Volume I (1992), xxvi + 733 pp.
Volume II (1994), xxviii + 786 pp.
Volume III (2002), xxx + 832 pp.
2. *Game and Economic Theory*, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (1995), vi + 463 pp. (co-edited with Abraham Neyman)
3. *Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches*, Springer Verlag (1997), vi + 328 pp. (co-edited with Andreu Mas-Colell)
4. *Simple Adaptive Strategies: From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics*, World Scientific Publishing (forthcoming 2012) (with Andreu Mas-Colell)

B. Lecture Notes and Other Publications

5. "Lecture Notes on Special Topics in Game Theory," Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University (1979)
6. "Stable Matchings and Medical Students: A Theory and Its Applications" [in Hebrew], *Kimat 2000 (Almost 2000)* 18 (1998), 14–16 (with Omri Eshhar)
7. "An Interview with Robert Aumann," *Macroeconomic Dynamics* 9 (2005), 683–740
- "An Interview with Robert Aumann," in *Inside the Economist's Mind: Conversations with Eminent Economists*, Paul A. Samuelson and William A. Barnett (editors), Blackwell Publishing (2006), 327–391
- "An Interview with Robert Aumann," *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung* 14 (2006), 1, 16–22 [excerpts]

- “An Interview with Robert Aumann,” *Newsletter of the European Mathematical Society* 60 (June 2006), 29–34 [excerpts]
- “Intervista a Robert Aumann,” *La Matematica nella Società e nella Cultura, Rivista dell’Unione Matematica Italiana Serie I, Vol. I* (April 2008), 57–86 [Italian translation, excerpts]
- *Razionalità, Cooperazione, Conflitto. Intervista sulla Teoria dei Giochi di Robert Aumann*, Editore Morcelliana (2008) [Italian translation]
- 8. “Invisible Hand? The Rationality of the Individual and the Welfare of the Group” [in Hebrew], in *One and All: In Science, Society, Art and Jewish Culture*, Emily D. Bilsky, Timna Seligman and Avigdor Shinan (editors), HaKibbutz HaMeuchad Publishing (2007), 40–43
- 9. “Five Questions on Game Theory,” in *Game Theory*, Vincent F. Hendricks and Pelle Guldberg Hansen (editors), Automatic Press – VIP (2007), 97–107
- 10. “Game Theory: Applied Pure Science” [in Hebrew], *The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Igeret* 29 (2007), 14–18
- 11. “Michael’s Questions: In Memory of Michael Maschler,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 64 (2008), 367

C. Articles

- 12. “Symmetric Solutions of Some Production Economies,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 2 (1973), 53–62
- 13. “Values of Mixed Games,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 2 (1973), 69–85
- 14. “Formation of Cartels in Large Markets,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 7 (1974), 453–466
- 15. “On Equilibrium Allocations as Distributions on the Commodity Space,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 1 (1974), 159–166 (with Werner Hildenbrand and Elon Kohlberg)
- 16. “Equally Distributed Correspondences,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 1 (1974), 167–174 (with Elon Kohlberg)
- 17. “A Note on the Edges of the n -Cube,” *Discrete Mathematics* 14 (1976), 157–163
- 18. “Asymptotic Value of Games with a Continuum of Players,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 4 (1977), 57–80
- 19. “Values of Non-Differentiable Markets with a Continuum of Traders,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 4 (1977), 103–116
- “Values of Non-Differentiable Markets with a Continuum of Traders,” in *Game and Economic Theory*, Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman (editors), The University of Michigan Press (1995), 321–334

20. “Values of Large Market Games,” in *Applied Game Theory*, Steven J. Brams, Andrew Schotter and Gerhard Schwödianer (editors), Physica-Verlag (1979), 187–197
21. “Measure-Based Values of Market Games,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 5 (1980), 197–228
22. “A Variational Problem Arising in Economics: Approximate Solutions and the Law of Large Numbers,” in *Game Theory and Mathematical Economics*, Otto Moeschlin and Diethard Pallaschke (editors), North-Holland (1981), 281–290
23. “Law of Large Numbers for Random Sets and Allocation Processes,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 6 (1981), 485–492 (with Zvi Artstein)
24. “The Number of Commodities Required to Represent a Market Game,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 27 (1982), 163–169
25. “Efficiency of Resource Allocation by Uninformed Demand,” *Econometrica* 50 (1982), 1453–1482 (with Theodore Groves)
26. “Pareto Optimal Nash Equilibria are Competitive in a Repeated Economy,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 28 (1982), 320–346 (with Mordecai Kurz)
27. “On Graphical Procedures for Multiple Comparisons,” *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 77 (1982), 767–772 (with Yosef Hochberg and Gideon Weiss)
28. “Termination of Probabilistic Concurrent Programs,” *Proceedings of the 9th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL)* (1982), 1–6 (with Micha Sharir and Amir Pnueli) [extended abstract]
- “Termination of Probabilistic Concurrent Programs,” *ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS)* 5 (1983), 356–380 (with Micha Sharir and Amir Pnueli)
29. “Endogenous Formation of Coalitions,” *Econometrica* 51 (1983), 1047–1064 (with Mordecai Kurz)
30. “Improving Some Multiple Comparisons Procedures,” *Annals of Statistics* 11 (1983), 121–128 (with Alexander Felzenbaum and Yosef Hochberg)
31. “Concurrent Probabilistic Programs, or: How to Schedule If You Must,” in *Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP)*, J. Diaz (editor), Springer-Verlag (1983), 304–318 (with Micha Sharir) [extended abstract]
- “Concurrent Probabilistic Programs, or: How to Schedule If You Must,” *SIAM Journal on Computing* 14 (1985), 991–1012 (with Micha Sharir)
32. “Stable Coalition Structures,” in *Coalitions and Collective Actions*, M. J. Holler (ed.), Physica-Verlag (1984), 235–258 (with Mordecai Kurz)
33. “Verification of Probabilistic Programs,” *SIAM Journal on Computing* 13 (1984), 292–314 (with Micha Sharir and Amir Pnueli)
34. “Probabilistic Temporal Logics for Finite and Bounded Models,” *Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)* (1984), 1–13 (with Micha Sharir) [extended abstract]

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- “Probabilistic Propositional Temporal Logics,” *Information and Control* 70 (1986), 97–155 (with Micha Sharir)
 - 35. “Nonlinearity of Davenport-Schinzel Sequences and of Generalized Path Compression Schemes,” *Proceedings of the 25th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)* (1984), 313–319 (with Micha Sharir) [extended abstract]
 - “Nonlinearity of Davenport-Schinzel Sequences and of Generalized Path Compression Schemes,” *Combinatorica* 6 (1986), 151–177 (with Micha Sharir)
 - 36. “Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 10 (1985), 117–153
 - “Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information,” *Game and Economic Theory*, Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman (editors), The University of Michigan Press (1995), 139–175
 - 37. “An Axiomatization of Harsanyi’s Non-Transferable Utility Solution,” *Econometrica* 53 (1985), 1295–1313
 - 38. “Non-Transferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Solution,” *Econometrica* 53 (1985), 1445–1450
 - 39. “Axiomatic Approaches to Coalitional Bargaining,” in *Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining*, Alvin E. Roth (editor), Cambridge University Press (1985), 305–319
 - 40. “Bi-Convexity and Bi-Martingales,” *Israel Journal of Mathematics* 54 (1986), 159–180 (with Robert J. Aumann)
 - “Bi-Convexity and Bi-Martingales,” in *Collected Papers of Robert J. Aumann*, The MIT Press, Vol. II (2000), 653–674 (with Robert J. Aumann)
 - 41. “Shapley Value,” in *The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (editors), Macmillan Press (1987), vol. 4, 318–320
 - “Shapley Value,” in *Game Theory*, John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (editors), Macmillan Press (1989), 210–216
 - 42. “Values of Non-Atomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 17 (1988), 31–40 (with Abraham Neyman)
 - 43. “The Potential of the Shapley Value,” in *The Shapley Value*, Alvin E. Roth (editor), Cambridge University Press (1988), 127–137 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
 - 44. “Potential, Value and Consistency,” *Econometrica* 57 (1989), 589–614 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
 - 45. “Existence of Correlated Equilibria,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 14 (1989), 18–25 (with David Schmeidler)
 - 46. “Advances in Value Theory,” in *Game Theory and Applications*, Tatsuuro Ichiishi, Abraham Neyman and Yair Tauman (editors), Academic Press (1990), 166–175

47. “Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms,” in *Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications*, Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart (editors), Elsevier Science Publishers–North-Holland, vol. I (1992), Chapter 2, 19–40
48. “A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential,” in *Rational Interaction*, Reinhard Selten (editor), Springer-Verlag (1992), 83–93 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
49. “On Prize Games,” in *Essays in Game Theory*, Nimrod Megiddo (editor), Springer Verlag (1994), 111–121
50. “The Harsanyi Value,” in *Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis (NATO ASI, Series D, Volume 77)*, Jean-François Mertens and Sylvain Sorin (editors), Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994), 105–111
51. “Value Equivalence Theorems: The TU and NTU Cases,” in *Game Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis (NATO ASI, Series D, Volume 77)*, Jean-François Mertens and Sylvain Sorin (editors), Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994), 113–120
52. “A Neo² Bayesian Foundation of the Maximin Strategy for Two-Person Zero-Sum Games,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 23 (1994), 347–358 (with Salvatore Modica and David Schmeidler)
53. “Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: I. A Continuum of Players,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 20 (1995), 959–1002 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
54. “Egalitarian Solutions of Large Games: II. The Asymptotic Approach,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 20 (1995), 1003–1022 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
55. “Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Non-Equivalence to Competitive Equilibria,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 13 (1996), 74–99 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
56. “Bargaining and Value,” *Econometrica* 64 (1996), 357–380 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
- “Bargaining and Value,” in *Recent Developments in Game Theory*, Eric S. Maskin (editor), Elgar Publishing (1999), 440–463 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
57. “‘Knowing whether’, ‘Knowing that’ and the Cardinality of State Spaces,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 70 (1996), 249–256 (with Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet)
58. “Classical Cooperative Theory I: Core-Like Concepts,” in *Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches*, Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell (editors), Springer-Verlag (1997), 35–42
59. “Classical Cooperative Theory II: Value-Like Concepts,” in *Cooperation: Game Theoretic Approaches*, Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell (editors), Springer-Verlag (1997), 43–49
60. “The Absent-Minded Driver,” in *Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Proceedings of the Sixth Conference*, Yoav Shoham (editor), Morgan Kaufmann (1996), 97–116 (with Robert J. Aumann and Motty Perry) [extended abstract]
- “The Absent-Minded Driver,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 20 (1997), 102–116 (with Robert J. Aumann and Motty Perry)
61. “The Forgetful Passenger,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 20 (1997), 117–120 (with Robert J. Aumann and Motty Perry)

62. “Potentials and Weighted Values of Non-Atomic Games,” *Mathematics of Operations Research* 22 (1997), 619–630 (with Dov Monderer)
63. “Significance Levels for Multiple Tests,” *Statistics and Probability Letters* 35 (1997), 43–48 (with Benjamin Weiss)
64. “Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 27 (1999), 204–228 (with Armando Gomes and Andreu Mas-Colell)
65. “Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement,” *Econometrica* 67 (1999), 909–912 (with Zohar Levy)
66. “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,” *Econometrica* 68 (2000), 1127–1150 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
67. “A General Class of Adaptive Strategies,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 98 (2001), 26–54 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
68. “A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium,” in *Economic Essays*, Gerard Debreu, Wilhelm Neufeind and Walter Trockel (editors), Springer (2001), 181–200 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
69. “Values of Perfectly Competitive Economies,” in *Handbook of Game Theory, with Economic Applications*, Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart (editors), Elsevier Science Publishers – North-Holland, Volume III (2002), Chapter 57, 2169–2184
70. “Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 41 (2002), 227–264
71. “Long Cheap Talk,” *Econometrica* 71 (2003), 1619–1660 (with Robert J. Aumann)
72. “Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 45 (2003), 375–394 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
73. “Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium,” *American Economic Review* 93 (2003), 1830–1836 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
74. “Market Crashes Without Exogenous Shocks,” *Journal of Business* 77 (2004), 1–8 (with Yair Tauman)
75. “A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values,” *Theory and Decision* 56 (2004), 35–46
76. “Decay and Growth for a Nonlinear Parabolic Difference Equation,” *Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society* 133 (2005), 2613–2620 (with Benjamin Weiss)
77. “An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 33 (2005), 355–366
78. “Adaptive Heuristics,” *Econometrica* 73 (2005), 1401–1430
79. “Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium,” *Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Proceedings of the Tenth Conference*, Ron van der Meyden (editor), National University of Singapore (2005), 52–61 (with Andreu Mas-Colell) [extended abstract]

80. “Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for the Study of Rationality DP-393, June 2005 (with Robert J. Aumann and Motty Perry)
- “Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 57 (2006), 286–303 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
81. “Robert Aumann’s Game and Economic Theory,” *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 108 (2006), 185–211
82. “The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Nash Equilibrium Procedures,” *Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)* (2007), 345–353 (with Yishay Mansour) [extended abstract]
- “How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 69 (2010), 107–126 (with Yishay Mansour)
83. “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies of Random Games, and the Vertices of Random Polygons,” *Annals of Applied Probability* 18 (2008), 259–287 (with Yosef Rinott and Benjamin Weiss)
84. “Shapley Value,” *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition*, Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (editors), Palgrave Macmillan (2008); also: *The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online* (2009)
- “Shapley Value,” *Game Theory*, Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (editors), Palgrave Macmillan (2009), 319–324
85. “Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games,” *International Journal of Game Theory* 36 (2008), 441–460
86. “An Operational Measure of Riskiness,” *Journal of Political Economy* 117 (2009), 785–814 (with Dean P. Foster)
87. “Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8 (2010), 7–33 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
88. “Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 71 (2011), 6–8
89. “A Simple Riskiness Order Leading to the Aumann–Serrano Index of Riskiness,” May 2008; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-517, July 2009
90. “Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection,” *Journal of Political Economy* 119 (2011), 617–638
91. “A Wealth-Requirement Axiomatization of Riskiness,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-577, June 2011 (with Dean P. Foster)
92. “Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-594 (December 2011) (with Philip J. Reny)
93. “Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items,” The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality DP-606 (April 2012) (with Noam Nisan)

D. In Preparation

94. “Matching Population Equilibrium,” 2005 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
95. “Agreeing on Decisions,” 2005 (with Robert J. Aumann)
96. “The Optimality of Regret Matching,” 2008 (with Elchanan Ben-Porath)
97. “Dynamics and Equilibrium,” 2008
98. “No Regret and Competitive Equilibria,” 2010 (with Andreu Mas-Colell)
99. “Revenue Maximization in Two Dimensions,” 2010 (with Philip J. Reny)
100. “Maximizing Revenue with Multiple Goods: Some Examples,” 2011 (with Philip J. Reny)
101. “Approximate Revenue Maximization for Two Items with Correlated Values,” 2012 (with Noam Nisan)

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