SIMPLE ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES
From Regret Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
World Scientific Series in Economic Theory - Volume 4
World Scientific Publishing, 2013
Book cover
Table of Contents
Preface
Eric Maskin
, Series Editor
Introduction
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Part I: Correlated Equilibria
Chapter 1:
Existence of Correlated Equilibria
Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler
Part II: Regret Matching
Chapter 2:
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 3:
A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 4:
A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 5:
Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 6:
General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria
Amotz Cahn
Part III: Uncoupled Dynamics
Chapter 7:
Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 8:
Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Chapter 9:
Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria
Yakov Babichenko
Chapter 10:
How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures
Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour
Part IV: Dynamics and Equilibria
Chapter 11:
Adaptive Heuristics
Sergiu Hart
Chapter 12:
Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics
Sergiu Hart
Last modified:
© Sergiu Hart