SIMPLE ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES
From Regret Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

World Scientific Series in Economic Theory - Volume 4
World Scientific Publishing, 2013

• Preface
  Eric Maskin, Series Editor
  
  
• Introduction
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  

• Chapter 1: Existence of Correlated Equilibria
  Sergiu Hart and David Schmeidler
  
  

• Chapter 2: A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 3: A General Class of Adaptive Strategies
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 4: A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 5: Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 6: General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria
  Amotz Cahn
  
  

• Chapter 7: Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 8: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium
  Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
  
  
• Chapter 9: Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria
  Yakov Babichenko
  
  
• Chapter 10: How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures
  Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour
  
  

• Chapter 11: Adaptive Heuristics
  Sergiu Hart
  
  
• Chapter 12: Nash Equilibrium and Dynamics
  Sergiu Hart