Sergiu Hart: Mechanism design papers

• Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "Approximate Revenue Maximization for Multiple Items"
• Sergiu Hart, "A Curious Property of Convex Functions and Mechanism Design"
• Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods?"
• Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "Selling Multiple Correlated Goods: Revenue Maximization and Menu-Size Complexity"
• Sergiu Hart and Phil Reny, "Maximizing Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations"
• Sergiu Hart and Phil Reny, "The Better Half of Selling Separately"
• Ran Ben Moshe, Sergiu Hart, and Noam Nisan "Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods"