A Reinforcement Procedure Leading to
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
We consider repeated games where at any period each player knows only his
set of actions and the stream of payoffs that he has received in the past.
He knows neither his own payoff function, nor the characteristics of the
other players (how many there are, their strategies and payoffs). In this
context, we present an adaptive procedure for play — called
“modified-regret-matching” — which is interpretable as a
stimulus-response or reinforcement procedure, and which has the property
that any limit point of the empirical distribution of play is a correlated
equilibrium of the stage game.
adaptive strategies, approachability, correlated equilibrium,
regret, regret-matching, reinforcement,
stimulus-response, unknown game.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:
C7, D7, C6